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Abstract 
Group buying as a new form of e-commerce has experienced rapid development over the past few 
years. Group-buying platforms offer a new channel for local small- to medium-sized companies to 
promote themselves, and also provide consumers with the opportunity to experience new products 
and services at deep discounts. In this paper, we examine merchants’ pricing strategies and 
consumers’ purchasing decisions when different types of information are available on a group-
buying platform. Consumers purchasing deals from group-buying platforms face a high level of 
quality uncertainty, due to lack of experience with the products and incomplete information about 
the products and merchants on group-buying platforms. The lack of face-to-face communication 
between customers and merchants before redeeming the deals also intensifies the uncertainty 
between the transacting parties. Group-buying platforms seek to alleviate such uncertainty by 
designing a rich user interface that contains various types of information about the merchants or the 
deals. We use a game-theoretic model to capture the interactions between merchants and 
consumers under three cases, contextualized by a simple, moderate, or complex information 
environment. We show that merchants benefit when the environment moves from a simple to 
moderate information environment, but further movement from a moderate to a complex 
information environment leads to a more intriguing effect on merchants’ discount strategies. In 
particular, very high-quality merchants or very low-quality merchants benefit from larger discounts 
in the context of complex information versus a moderate information environment; therefore, such 
merchants are disadvantaged when more than a moderate amount of information is provided. Our 
analysis shows that providing more information can harm merchants under certain conditions; we 
offer implications for merchants as well as for the group-buying platforms concerning their 
information strategies. 
Keywords: Group Buying, Online Platforms, Information Asymmetry, Game Theory 
Kenny Cheng was the accepting senior editor. This research article was submitted on December 2, 2016 and went 
through 2 revisions.  
1 Introduction 
Group buying constitutes an adventurous exploration 
of the e-commerce world by entrepreneurs who 
foresee the potential of social commerce. The success 
of Groupon, LivingSocial, and many other similar 
group-buying websites have made group buying a 
popular and sometimes necessary option for an 
enormous number of local merchants and consumers. 
Local merchants offer products and services at a 
discounted price through an online group-buying 
platform, and consumers purchase vouchers through 
the platform entitling them to consume the product 
later from the merchant directly. The popularity of 
group buying is supported by the multiple benefits it 
offers to both merchants and consumers. Since 
merchants on group-buying websites tend to be small- 




to medium-sized local merchants, group-buying 
platforms offer an economical and efficient promotion 
channel for such merchants to reach new customers. 
Merchants share a percentage of their revenue from 
vouchers sold as a commission to the platform, and 
there is no up-front cost to join the platform. 
Consumers, on the other hand, get the opportunity to 
experience previously unfamiliar products and 
services at a discounted price and therefore at lower 
risk. One prominent and common feature on group-
buying platforms is a rich user interface, which 
provides multiple sources of information to facilitate 
consumers’ purchasing decisions, a promotional 
setting that is scarcely possible offline. Through deal 
pages, merchants can share information about their 
products, such as the original price, the discount 
level, the discounted price, a description of the 
merchant, a description of the product characteristics, 
etc. Along with the above information from the 
merchants, platforms also display another important 
type of information—the number of vouchers sold. 
This study analyzes the role of information disclosure 
on the effectiveness of group-buying promotions. We 
develop a game-theoretic model in order to capture 
the interactions between merchants and consumers on 
a group-buying platform, with the objective of 
developing a theoretical framework for the optimal 
information structure that suits different types of 
merchants with different market characteristics. This 
paper answers two research questions. (1) How does 
the information available on the group-buying platform, 
such as price, discount level, quantity sold, etc., affect 
consumers’ purchasing decisions and merchants’ pricing 
decisions? And (2) under what information structure can 
merchants most effectively promote themselves in the 
context of a group-buying platform? 
For this study, we consider an incomplete information 
setting, in which merchants disclose partial quality 
attributes to consumers. There are several things that 
make the information setting incomplete. First, 
vendors on group-buying platforms are mostly small- 
to medium-sized local merchants and customers on 
these platforms are mostly first-time shoppers with 
the merchants (Dimoka et al., 2012). This thus 
naturally engenders a high level of uncertainty 
between the trading parties, and this uncertainty is 
difficult to eliminate through the information revealed 
on a deal’s webpage. Furthermore, most products 
contain both search attributes, which are easy to 
describe through words or pictures, and experience 
attributes, which customers can evaluate only through 
consuming the product (Nelson, 1970). The quality of 
a product is determined by the quality of both types of 
attributes, which we refer to as search quality and 
experience quality throughout the paper. Both 
experience quality and search quality can vary among 
vendors. In this paper, we use high- and low-quality 
vendor to refer to vendors whose product is of overall 
high or low quality. Experience quality introduces 
uncertainty into consumers’ purchases because it 
cannot be evaluated before purchase. Additionally, 
merchants may strategically withhold certain 
information from customers in order to influence 
consumers’ purchasing decisions in favor of the 
merchants. The incomplete nature of the information 
provided on these sites naturally complicates consumers’ 
purchasing decisions (Dimoka et al., 2012).  
Merchants’ main objective on these platforms is to 
advertise their products to consumers who are 
unaware of their products but who would be willing 
to purchase them at the regular price once acquainted 
with the product quality. The group-buying 
mechanism allows merchants to offer such consumers 
an opportunity to sample the product at a discount, 
with the anticipation that, after experiencing it, they 
will continue to purchase the product at the regular 
price. Dholakia’s (2012) survey indicates that up to 
80 percent of customers on group-buying websites are 
first-time customers. However, merchants must 
contend with two challenging categories of 
customers: Some first-time customers may purchase 
the product through the group-buying platform at a 
deep discount, but do not value the product enough to 
purchase it at the regular price. As such, this type of 
consumer will not become a long-term customer. 
Second, some consumers on the group-buying 
platform are existing customers of the merchants and 
have already experienced the product quality. 
We refer to customers with prior experience about the 
product as informed customers, while uninformed 
customers indicate customers with no prior 
knowledge of the product. Informed customers have 
already experienced the quality attributes of the 
product, while uninformed customers are new 
customers with no prior experience with the product. 
Informed customers thus have an information 
advantage over the uninformed customers. As 
discussed and modeled below, this information 
advantage is reflected in the purchasing decisions of 
the informed customers, which can help uninformed 
customers form an expectation about the attributes 
of the unknown product. 
Inherent to group-buying websites are some unique 
features that reveal different types of information and 
are capable of bridging the information gap between 
the two types of consumers. The most significant 
feature is information about the number of vouchers 
sold, which is usually displayed in a prominent 
position on a deal’s web page. A high number of 
vouchers sold indicates that many customers have 
viewed this product and decided to purchase it. Early 
consumer purchasing decisions serve as an important 
piece of information for later consumers facing the 
same decision-making process. We argue that the 
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early purchasers tend to be informed customers who 
are well aware of the product quality; therefore, we 
maintain that the quantity sold is a reflection of 
informed consumers’ purchasing decisions, which are 
based on their personal knowledge of the true value of 
the product quality. Another feature is the discount level 
displayed on a deal’s page. Although discounts lead to 
economic savings for customers, they can also be 
coupled with negative effects on consumer decision-
making. Due to their online context, group- buying 
platforms inherently invoke a high degree of uncertainty 
for consumers, which is further elevated by the fact that 
most consumers on the websites are new customers 
(Dholakia, 2012; Tuttle, 2012). As such, a large discount 
can operate as a negative signal about product quality 
and hence reduce the number of purchases.  
However, it is worth noting that, beyond the unknown 
quality attributes, consumers with no prior experience 
with the merchants also lack another critical piece of 
information—that is, the proportion of existing 
customers of a product. In other words, consumers 
who are new to the merchants’ products know that 
informed customers exist, but they do not know the 
market coverage—i.e., the ratio of informed versus 
uninformed customers. As a result, consumers are 
unable to assess the true level of quality in the 
traditional learning context. Therefore, they can 
only assume that different types of information 
influence customers’ belief positively or 
negatively, and we thus investigate the effect of 
different levels of information exposure on the 
effectiveness of group-buying promotions. 
Merchants determine the price or the corresponding 
discount level with the objective of attracting 
uninformed customers who would be willing to 
purchase the product at the regular price in the future. 
We refer to these customers as convertible customers. 
A large discount imposes two opposing forces on 
uninformed consumers’ purchasing decisions. On the 
one hand, it invokes consumers’ suspicions about 
product quality and negatively affects their intention 
to purchase. On the other hand, a large discount not 
only leads to high price savings, but also results in a 
higher number of vouchers sold from informed 
consumers; both factors can encourage uninformed 
consumers to purchase from an unfamiliar merchant. 
Also, a large discount can induce many informed 
consumers to purchase, leading to a higher quantity of 
vouchers sold. The quantity sold can then positively 
affect the uninformed consumers’ purchasing decisions. 
We examine merchants’ pricing strategies, accounting 
for all these potential factors, and analyze the impact of 
various factors on the optimal price decisions. 
We analyze both merchants’ and consumers’ 
strategies in scenarios with (1) a simple information 
environment with no information signal, (2) a 
moderate information environment with quantity 
signals, and (3) a complex information environment 
with both quantity and discount signals. Our analysis 
generated several main findings: First, the 
information environment on a group-buying platform 
has a critical impact on merchants’ decisions to join 
the platform and offer discount promotions. When the 
platform provides no information signal to facilitate 
consumers’ purchases, the platform appeals to a 
limited group of merchants offering high experience 
quality, while the rest of the merchants do not benefit 
from discount promotions. When the platform reveals 
more information on the platform to guide consumers, 
it motivates other merchants with low experience 
quality to join the platform and offer discount 
promotions. Second, information signaling is crucial 
for effective discount promotions. The objective of 
attracting all convertible customers can only be 
achieved when the platform provides quality signals 
to consumers. Further, more information can also be 
harmful to some merchants because merchants may 
be forced to offer higher discounts as more 
information signals become available. For instance, 
vendors with very low or very high experience quality 
offer higher discounts in the complex information 
environment than they do in the moderate information 
environment. The reason for this is that more 
information motivates more merchants to join the price 
promotion, and intensifies the competition among 
merchants to gain customers. We also provide insights 
on the effect of market composition and consumers’ 
belief formation on merchants’ discounting strategies.  
This paper makes several contributions. First, we 
offer a unique focus on the signal structure of group-
buying platforms, and we assess the effects of 
different signals on merchants’ promotion 
effectiveness. Our analysis generates the 
counterintuitive result that more information can be 
bad for both merchants and platform owners. Second, 
our findings have important implications for 
entrepreneurs about the intricate role of information 
for merchants’ and consumers’ behaviors. When 
establishing an online business, entrepreneurs face the 
critical decision of how to create an online 
environment with various types of information 
displayed across webpages in order to entice 
consumers to make purchases. Understanding the 
consequences of information on consumers is 
therefore a critical element in designing an online 
shopping platform and creating an online consumer 
experience. Finally, our study adds to the growing 
group-buying literature in two ways. To the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first study that examines 
different information structures present on group- 
buying platforms and that focuses on the potential 
negative effects of information. Also, most existing 
studies on group buying are based on the critical 
assumption that consumers know the market 
situations of the products and that they can rationally 




learn the true quality of the products in equilibrium 
(Subramanian and Rao, 2016). We emphasize the fact 
that consumers have little knowledge about merchants 
and their products or services on group-buying 
platforms. We examine these customers’ reactions to 
deals on sites such as groupon.com and we offer 
suggestions to merchants as well as the platforms to 
better capture these uninformed and valuable customers. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In 
Section 2, we survey the related literature. Section 3 
describes the model setup. Section 4 presents the 
model analysis. Section 5 discusses the implications 
of providing more information. We conclude the 
paper in Section 6.  
2 Related Literature 
Our study is closely related to studies on group-
buying platforms. Selling through a platform offers 
strategic values to online retailers (Kwark et al., 
2016). Yang et al. (2016) study vendors’ decisions to 
join a group-buying platform or not and discover a 
critical range where vendors are better off by joining 
such a platform. Jing and Xie (2011) compare group 
selling to conventional single-unit selling and 
promotion strategies and focused on the information 
gap between the two sales channels. Our current 
study further explores the information structure that 
enables customers to bridge the information gap, and 
investigates the effectiveness of group selling in 
different product contexts. Hu et al. (2013) compare 
simultaneous and sequential group-buying 
mechanisms for the categories of necessity and luxury 
goods. Our study examines more generally the 
impacts of product features on group-buying platform 
strategies. Shivendu and Zhang (2013) study the 
strategic interactions between merchants and the 
group-buying platform, and derive the optimal 
discount strategies. In comparison, we study 
merchants’ discount strategies from the perspective of 
quality signals and customer acquisition. Edelman et 
al. (2014) and Kumar and Rajan (2012) study the 
profitability of selling through group-buying 
platforms. Subramanian and Rao (2016) examine the 
signaling effect of discounts and how consumers learn 
about product quality through the discount levels. Our 
study differs from the above literature in that we 
adopt an incomplete information structure, according 
to which consumers cannot infer the true quality of 
the product even in equilibrium. Also, we combine 
two sources of information signals—quantity and 
discount level—in consumers’ decisions. We take the 
unique angle of comparing merchants’ performance 
when different types of signals are available. 
Another related stream of research examines the 
signaling role of prices. Prior studies offer evidence 
that prices can affect how consumers perceive the 
quality of corresponding products. A high price can 
be used as a signal that differentiates high-quality 
sellers from low-quality sellers, and, therefore, 
customers tend to rationally perceive that high quality 
correlates with a high price tag in equilibrium 
(Kirmani and Rao, 2000; Rao, 2005). There is an 
extensive literature in information economics 
showing that price can be a credible signal of quality 
in various market settings (Bagwell and Riordan, 
1991; Wolinsky, 1983; Daughety and Reinganum, 
2007, 2008; Janssen and Roy, 2010). In particular, 
Wolinsky (1983) and Bagwell and Riordan (1991) 
both demonstrate that such signaling effect can result 
from the presence of customers who are more 
informed about product quality. In an experimental 
study, Shiv et al. (2005) shows that customers may 
lower their expectations of product quality when they 
pay a discount price, and later overevaluate the actual 
performance of the product. Rao (2005) provides 
similar evidence showing that consumers are 
cognitively miserly and are likely to adopt a price-
quality heuristic. Our paper contributes to this 
literature by examining the signaling role of 
discounted price in a group-buying setting where the 
price is set strategically with the unconventional 
objective of effectively promoting the product, 
beyond the objective of generating revenue. Our 
study shows that, in this setting, price continues to 
moderate consumers’ purchasing decisions. 
Our study is also related to the vast literature on 
product uncertainty in online commerce. The time 
and spatial separation between online sellers and 
buyers leads to a high level of information asymmetry 
between the trading parties, which in turn leads to 
high levels of perceived uncertainty in the online 
environment (Dewan and Hsu, 2004; Jin and Kato, 
2006; Ghose, 2009; Li et al., 2009; Dimoka et al., 
2012). Studies have shown that consumers’ 
purchasing decisions are significantly affected by the 
existence of product uncertainty (Brynjolfsson and 
Smith, 2000; Ba and Pavlou, 2002; Overby and Jap, 
2009; Kim and Krishnan, 2015; Kwark et al., 2016). 
Kwark et al. (2014) discovered that product reviews, 
while containing information about product quality, 
can harm the retailer or the manufacturer. Our study 
extends this literature to the context of group-buying 
websites, where the platforms engage in various 
information structure designs to alleviate the product 
uncertainty involved in the transactions, and also 
demonstrates that releasing more information can 
actually harm vendors under certain conditions. 
3 Model Description 
We consider a game between a vendor and a mass of 
1 consumer. The vendor sells one type of product in 
two periods. In the first period, the vendor sells 
through a group-buying platform (GBP) at a 
discounted price 𝑝𝑝1. In the second period, the vendor 
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sells through his or her own store at the regular price 
of 𝑝𝑝. Let 1 − 𝑑𝑑 be the discount rate in the context of 
group buying, then 𝑝𝑝1 = 𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝 . The product contains 
two types of attributes, search and experience. The 
quality of the product therefore depends on both types 
of attributes. The vendor reveals information about 
the search attributes through the group-buying 
website, and we denote the quality related to the 
search attributes as 𝑎𝑎0 . The experience attributes 
cannot be revealed through the website, and can only 
be assessed through consumption of the product 
(Nelson, 1970). We assume that it is public 
knowledge that the quality of the experience 
attributes is uniformly distributed on [𝑎𝑎1, ?̄?𝑎1]. We use 
𝑎𝑎1 to refer to the true value of the experience quality. 
The consumers also differ in their misfit 𝜏𝜏 with the 
product, and 𝜏𝜏 is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. The 
misfit characterizes consumers’ horizontal difference 
in their evaluation of the product, and consumers 
know their own misfit. 
There are two types of consumers. A proportion 𝜆𝜆 of 
the consumers are informed (I) consumers, who have 
prior experience with the product and know the true 
quality of the experience attributes 𝑎𝑎1. The rest 1 − 𝜆𝜆 
are uninformed (UI) consumers, who have no 
experience of the product and hold a belief 𝑎𝑎�1  about 
the quality of the experience attributes. Each consumer 
demands at most one unit of the product in each 
period1. The utility from the product is 𝑢𝑢 = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1 −
𝜏𝜏  and 𝑢𝑢 = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎�1 − 𝜏𝜏  for informed and uninformed 
consumers respectively. We assume the informed and 
uninformed consumers are independently distributed in 
𝜏𝜏. In other words, 𝜏𝜏 captures the characteristics of the 
consumers and is independent of one’s prior 
experience with the product. 
Given price 𝑝𝑝 , there exists a consumer who is 
indifferent between buying and not buying the product. 
We define this consumer as ?̄?𝜏𝐼𝐼  and ?̄?𝜏𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼  respectively, 
with the subscript indicating whether the consumer is 
informed, and they satisfy the following conditions:  
𝑝𝑝 = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1 − ?̄?𝜏𝐼𝐼 , (1) 
                 𝑝𝑝 = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎�1 − ?̄?𝜏𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼 . (2) 
                                                     
1 In practice, group-buying websites, such as groupon.com, 
often include a limit on the number of vouchers that a 
customer is allowed to purchase, which is intended to 
prevent repeated purchases by consumers. We believe 
repeated purchases will not affect our model and findings. 
With the uncertainty that uninformed consumers face, 
informed consumers would be more likely to purchase 
multiple vouchers than uninformed consumers—in 
which case, as discussed below, the quantity sold would 
be a less accurate signal and could be easily captured 
through a lower 𝛼𝛼, making more of our results robust to 
different levels of 𝛼𝛼. 
We solve for the cutoffs as ?̄?𝜏𝐼𝐼 = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1 − 𝑝𝑝  and 
?̄?𝜏𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼 = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎�1 − 𝑝𝑝. We denote 𝑞𝑞(𝑝𝑝) as the proportion 
of informed consumers who purchase at price 𝑝𝑝, and 
𝑞𝑞(𝑝𝑝) = ?̄?𝜏𝐼𝐼 . We denote and 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼  as the proportion of 
uninformed consumers who purchase in the first 
period at the promotion price, and 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼 = ?̄?𝜏𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼 .  
The vendor’s profit from selling through a group- 
buying platform in period 1 is 
𝜋𝜋1 = (𝜆𝜆𝑞𝑞(𝑝𝑝1) + (1 − 𝜆𝜆)𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼)𝑝𝑝1. (3) 
In period 2, some of the uninformed consumers who 
purchased in period 1 may continue to purchase at the 
regular price. The demand from uninformed 
consumers in period 2 is therefore (1 −
𝜆𝜆) min { 𝑞𝑞(𝑝𝑝), 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼}. The vendor’s profit in period 2 is  
 
   𝜋𝜋2 = (𝜆𝜆𝑞𝑞(𝑝𝑝) + (1 − 𝜆𝜆) min { 𝑞𝑞(𝑝𝑝), 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼})𝑝𝑝.        (4) 
 
Note that, (1 − 𝜆𝜆)𝑞𝑞(𝑝𝑝)  are the uninformed 
consumers who would have bought under the regular 
price 𝑝𝑝 if they knew 𝑎𝑎1, and we call these customers 
the convertible customers. On the other hand, the rest 
of the uninformed customers, (1 − 𝜆𝜆)(1 − 𝑞𝑞(𝑝𝑝)) are 
not convertible because their valuation for the product 
is so low that they would not purchase at the regular 
price 𝑝𝑝 even if they had complete information about 
the product. When 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼 < 𝑞𝑞(𝑝𝑝) , the vendor attracts 
some of theconvertible customers through group 
selling, and when 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼 ≥ 𝑞𝑞(𝑝𝑝) , all convertible 
customers are attracted through group selling. In the 
following analysis, we focus on the case where the 
vendor can attract all convertible customers to 
purchase in the promotion. This assumption allows us 
to focus on vendors whose objective for the 
promotion is not only to generate revenue, but also to 
promote the product to uninformed customers, 
particularly the convertible customers.  
The vendor’s decision is to choose the discount price 𝑝𝑝1 
to maximize the overall profit across period 1 and period 
2. We describe the objective formally as the following. 
𝜋𝜋 = max
𝑝𝑝1
𝜋𝜋1 + 𝜓𝜓𝜋𝜋2. (5) 
We use 𝜓𝜓 to describe the relative importance of the 
long-term profit from sales at the regular price and 
the current profit from group selling. For example, 
spas, movie theaters, and restaurants have more 
incentive to attract long-term buyers, and buyers also 
tend to go back to the same vendor if they are 
satisfied. On the other hand, vendors with low 𝜓𝜓 
either have a high discount factor or expect fewer 
repeat purchases due to the nature of the products. 
Examples include durable goods, such as electronic 
devices, hospital services, etc.  




In the following, we consider an ideal case where all 
consumers are informed and 𝑎𝑎1 is public knowledge. 
In this special case, the vendor chooses a price to 
optimize its revenue, without any consideration for 
attracting uninformed consumers. Since there is no 
uncertainty among the consumers, the vendor has no 
incentive to offer discounts through the group-buying 
platform and will set the same price for both periods. 
This benchmark shows the vendor’s and the 
consumers’ strategies in the absence of uncertainty. 
The optimal price is determined by the following: 
𝜋𝜋 = max
𝑝𝑝
𝑝𝑝 𝑞𝑞(𝑝𝑝) + 𝜓𝜓𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞(𝑝𝑝) 
                         = max
𝑝𝑝
( 1 + 𝜓𝜓)𝑝𝑝 ∫ 𝑓𝑓1𝑎𝑎1+𝑎𝑎0−𝑝𝑝 (𝑥𝑥)𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥. 
which leads to 𝑝𝑝∗ = 𝑎𝑎0+𝑎𝑎1
2
. Consumers with 𝜏𝜏 ∈
[0, 𝑎𝑎0+𝑎𝑎1
2
] purchase the product.  
It is worth noting that, if the vendor can successfully 
attract all convertible customers in the first period, their 
second period pricing follows the above strategy. 
4 Information Environment 
Our focus of analysis is on the information 
environment that a group-buying platform designs for 
the vendors and its impact on vendors’ pricing power, 
as well as the effectiveness in converting all 
convertible customers. We examine three different 
information environments and compare vendors’ and 
customers’ strategies under each of them. The 
objective is to investigate the role of different 
information sources, such as different product 
properties, as well as different market positions, in 
inducing effective promotion. In the following, we 
assume that the informed consumers move first to 
make purchases before the uninformed consumers do. 
The assumption allows us to focus on the 
informational advantage of the informed consumers. 
In practice, however, it is possible that uninformed 
consumers purchase right after a deal is posted, 
especially if the price if low enough. We decided to 
exclude this scenario from our study because the 
information role of the informed consumers is silent 
in this case. 
4.1   Simple Information Environment 
We start with a simple information environment, 
where the vendor sells the product at a discount in the 
first period without providing any additional 
information for the consumers to learn about the 
product. We observe such promotions in both online 
and offline settings, where consumers cannot see 
previous buyers in the promotion. This simple 
information case allows us to focus on the impact of 
the discount itself. With no additional information, 
the consumers use their prior belief, the average â1 = 
𝑎𝑎1+ 𝑎𝑎1 
2
 to make their purchase decision, and the 
corresponding cutoff consumer has ?̃?𝜏 = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎�1 −
𝑝𝑝1; that is, consumers with 𝜏𝜏 ≤ ?̃?𝜏 will purchase. In the 
second period, ?̃?𝜏 of the uninformed consumers have 
discovered the true 𝑎𝑎1, and consumers with 𝜏𝜏 ≥ 𝑎𝑎0 +
𝑎𝑎1 − 𝑝𝑝  are willing to purchase at 𝑝𝑝 . Hence, the 
demand from the uninformed consumers is 
min { 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1 − 𝑝𝑝, ?̃?𝜏}. In other words, an uninformed 
consumer is convertible, when his or her willingness to 
pay exceeds 𝑝𝑝  once becoming informed of 𝑎𝑎1 . We 
denote the optimal price in this case with a superscript 𝑠𝑠 
to indicate that it is the simple information scenario.  
When 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1 − 𝑝𝑝 < ?̃?𝜏 , some of the consumers 
attracted by the low price in the first period will not 
make further purchases. The demand in the second 
period from both the informed and the uninformed 
consumers is 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1 − 𝑝𝑝 . The optimal promotion 
price 𝑝𝑝1  can be derived through the first-order 
condition of 𝜋𝜋1 as  
𝑝𝑝1𝑠𝑠 =
𝑎𝑎0 + 𝜆𝜆𝑎𝑎1 + (1 − 𝜆𝜆)𝑎𝑎�1
2
. 
In the second period, the demand from both informed 
and uninformed consumers is 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1 − 𝑝𝑝 . The 
optimal regular price can be solved by maximizing 𝜋𝜋2 
(following similar procedures as in the case with full 
information) as 𝑝𝑝 = 𝑎𝑎0+𝑎𝑎1
2
. If we reorganize 𝑝𝑝1𝑠𝑠  as 
𝑝𝑝1𝑠𝑠 = 𝑝𝑝 + (1 − 𝜆𝜆)
𝛥𝛥𝑎𝑎1
2
 and denote the discount in this 






. It is easy 
to see that, only vendors whose quality is below 
average will offer discounts when the information 
environment is simple, i.e., 𝑎𝑎1 > 𝑎𝑎�1.  
To ensure that all convertible consumers purchase in 
the promotion, we need 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1 − 𝑝𝑝 < ?̃?𝜏 , which is 
equivalent to 𝑎𝑎1 < 𝑎𝑎�1 . Note that, this condition 
contradicts the earlier result that only above-average 
vendors offer discounts. In other words, for a group- 
buying platform with a simple information 
environment, only high-quality vendors participate; 
however, they cannot motivate all convertible 
customers to purchase through the promotion. We 
present this finding formally in the following.  
Lemma 1. For a platform with a simple information 
environment, vendors whose experience quality is 
above consumers’ prior beliefs have incentives to 
offer promotions; however, not all convertible 
consumers purchase during the promotion. 
This result states that a platform with no additional 
information is more favorable to vendors with 
superior quality, but that even these high-quality 
vendors cannot necessarily promote effectively, as 
there will always be some valuable consumers 
who will not purchase at the discounted price. In 
the simple information case, the platform plays a 
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weak role in assisting consumers’ purchasing 
decisions, and consumers face high uncertainty in 
making their purchasing decisions.  
Our finding points to two drawbacks of a platform 
with a simple information environment. On the one 
hand, such a platform is suitable only to high-quality 
vendors, who have a large proportion of consumers 
who are convertible. Low-quality vendors will not 
benefit from price promotion because the benefit from 
their low proportion of convertible consumers is 
outweighed by the high cost of offering discounts. On 
the other hand, high-quality vendors who indeed offer 
discounts may fail to attract all valuable customers 
through the promotion. Customers with very low misfit 
cost will purchase through the promotion, but those with 
relatively high misfit cost will find it not worthwhile to 
purchase the deal, due to the high uncertainty they face 
regarding the vendor’s experience quality. Overall, the 
above result highlights the necessity of enhancing the 
information environment and we discuss two such cases 
in the following subsections. 
4.2   Moderate Information Environment 
We now turn to a more sophisticated information 
environment, where the platform discloses to 
consumers the number of vouchers sold. When an 
uninformed consumer comes to the platform, the 
quantity sold (which is provided and often updated on 
websites like Groupon, LivingSocial, etc.) is an 
indicator of how previous buyers perceive the quality 
of the underlying products/services. The higher the 
quantity sold, the more popular the deal is, i.e., the 
more people perceive the deal as worthwhile. We 
hence assume an updating rule of 𝑎𝑎�1 = 𝜇𝜇𝑎𝑎1 +
(1 − 𝜇𝜇)𝑎𝑎�1, where 𝜇𝜇 = 𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆𝑞𝑞(𝑝𝑝1).  
We interpret this updating rule as follows. The 
demand from informed consumers, 𝜆𝜆𝑞𝑞(𝑝𝑝1), contains 
information about the true quality 𝑎𝑎1 . However, 
consumers cannot infer the true quality 𝑎𝑎1 accurately 
since they lack information about the proportion of 
existing consumers, 𝜆𝜆. Instead, they find out the true 
quality 𝑎𝑎1 with a probability 𝜇𝜇, and with probability 
1 − 𝜇𝜇, they continue to use their prior belief 𝑎𝑎�1. The 
probability 𝜇𝜇  is increasing in the observed demand 
from the informed consumers, and 𝛼𝛼  is a scalar to 
ensure 𝜇𝜇 ∈ [0,1], and we let 𝛼𝛼 ∈ [0, 1
𝜆𝜆(𝑎𝑎0+?̄?𝑎1)
]. In other 
words, the observed demand determines the accuracy 
of consumers’ updated beliefs.  
We next analyze consumers’ purchasing decisions 
based on the above updating rule. We focus on the 
case where all convertible customers purchase during 
the promotion. We use the superscript 𝑚𝑚 to indicate 
the optimal decision from the case of the moderate 
information environment, as the consumers update 
their beliefs based on the number of vouchers sold. 
The vendor chooses the optimal discount price 𝑝𝑝1𝑚𝑚 to 
maximize the following objective 
𝜋𝜋1 = (𝜆𝜆𝑞𝑞(𝑝𝑝1𝑚𝑚) + (1 − 𝜆𝜆)𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼)𝑝𝑝1𝑚𝑚 . 
First order condition leads to 𝑝𝑝1𝑚𝑚 =
𝑎𝑎0+𝜆𝜆𝑎𝑎1+(1−𝜆𝜆)𝑎𝑎�1−𝛥𝛥𝑎𝑎1𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆(1−𝜆𝜆)(𝑎𝑎0+𝑎𝑎1)
2(1−𝛥𝛥𝑎𝑎1𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆(1−𝜆𝜆))
, with Δ𝑎𝑎1 = 𝑎𝑎�1 −
𝑎𝑎1. The second period price is derived by optimizing 
𝜋𝜋2  in a similar fashion as in the full information 
benchmark, and 𝑝𝑝 = 𝑎𝑎0+𝑎𝑎1
2
. We rearrange the discount 




The vendor has an incentive to offer a price 
promotion when 𝑝𝑝1𝑚𝑚 < 𝑝𝑝 , i.e., 
(1−𝜆𝜆)𝛥𝛥𝑎𝑎1
2(1−𝛥𝛥𝑎𝑎1𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆(1−𝜆𝜆))
< 0 . 
We derive the condition as Δ𝑎𝑎1 >
1
𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆(1−𝜆𝜆)
 or Δ𝑎𝑎1 < 0. 
In other words, vendors offer discounts when their 
experience quality is above average or significantly 
below average. We summarize the result formally in 
the following.  
Lemma 2. When the group-buying platform provides 
moderate information environment, 




or when 𝑎𝑎�1 < 𝑎𝑎1 < ?̄?𝑎1. 
This result states that when consumers can update 
their beliefs through the observed quantity of sales, 
not only vendors with above average experience 
quality join the promotion, but also those with very 
low experience quality. Recall that in the case with 
simple information, price promotion is only favorable 
for high-quality vendors. This shows that by 
facilitating consumers’ purchasing decisions, group-
buying platforms provide an additional opportunity 
to low-quality vendors. 
We next verify that all convertible customers are 
attracted through the promotion, i.e., 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1 − 𝑝𝑝 <






− 𝑎𝑎1. We summarize the 
result formally in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1. When the group-buying platform 
provides a moderate information environment, 
vendors can attract all convertible customers if 
(1) their experience quality 𝑎𝑎1 is above average, i.e., 
max {𝑎𝑎�1,𝐴𝐴1} < 𝑎𝑎1 < ?̄?𝑎1, or  
(2) when 𝑎𝑎1  is significantly below average quality, 
i.e., 𝑎𝑎1 < 𝑎𝑎1 < min {𝑎𝑎�1 −
1
𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆(1−𝜆𝜆)
,𝐴𝐴1}.   
With moderate information, the platform is more 
suitable for vendors with either very high or very low 
experience quality. Vendors with very high 
experience quality can easily attract a high number of 
informed consumers to purchase their deals. The 
resulting high quantity of sales can in turn encourage 




the uninformed consumers to purchase. Similarly, 
vendors with very low experience quality also benefit 
because they have a very small proportion of 
convertible customers. Despite their low quality, these 
vendors can offer very deep discounts to boost the sales 
from the informed consumers, and in turn attract all 
convertible customers. It is worth noting that, without 
quantity information, neither the high-quality nor the 
low-quality vendors can attract their convertible 
customers, even if they offer deep discounts. 
We also compare the discount level in this case with 
the simple promotion case. Since the simple 
promotion only applies to vendors with above 
average experience quality, we restrict our 
comparison to Δ𝑎𝑎1 < 0 .The following corollary 
summarizes the result. 
Corollary 1. When the group-buying platform provides 
a moderate information environment, vendors with the 
same experience quality choose to offer smaller 
discounts in comparison to the simple information case. 
4.3   Complex Information Environment 
We now turn to the case where more complex 
information is provided to consumers. Besides 
observing the quantity sold, the platform also 
emphasizes the role of discount (price) information in 
consumers’ decision-making. We assume the 
following updating rule:  
𝑎𝑎�1 = 𝜇𝜇𝑎𝑎1 + (1 − 𝜇𝜇)𝑎𝑎�1, 
where 𝜇𝜇 = 𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆𝑞𝑞(𝑝𝑝1) + (1 −𝑚𝑚)𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝1.  
In the above updating rule, both 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽 are scalars to 
ensure that 𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆𝑞𝑞(𝑝𝑝1) ∈ [0,1] and 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝1 ∈ [0,1]. To be 
more specific, we let 𝛼𝛼 ∈ [0, 1
𝜆𝜆(𝑎𝑎0+?̄?𝑎1)
]  and 𝛽𝛽 ∈
[1, 1
𝑎𝑎0+?̄?𝑎1
]. The term 𝑚𝑚 reflects the relative weight of 
the two sources of information. A higher 𝑚𝑚  means 
that consumers put more weight on the observed 
number of vouchers sold, and vice versa.  
Note that this updating rule captures the effect of the 
discount in two opposing directions. As the discount 
level increases, meaning that 𝑝𝑝1 decreases, on the one 
hand it has the direct effect of lowering consumers’ 
belief about the unobserved quality. It is worth noting 
that this direct effect of the discount has been 
established in the prior literature on price as a signal 
for quality—i.e., it has been discovered that low 
prices (i.e., a large discount) may operate as a 
negative signal for quality, leading consumers to 
think negatively about the product quality (Bagwell 
and Riordan, 1991; Daughety and Reinganum, 2007; 
Janssen and Roy, 2010). On the other hand, large 
discounts may lead to a higher number of vouchers 
sold, and therefore can indirectly lead to an increase 
in consumers’ beliefs in the unobserved quality of the 
product. With these two opposing forces in place, we 
find it interesting to examine the overall effect of 
discounts on consumers’ purchasing decisions, as well as 
to compare consumers’ behavior under this updating rule 
to that of the previous case. We use superscript 𝑐𝑐 to refer 
to this case with the complex information environment. 
We first derive the optimal price under this case. The 




, which can 




We have the following result on vendors’ incentives 
for participating in group buying. Recall that in our 
previous analysis, we discovered that certain vendors 
of below average quality may not benefit from 
offering discounts through a group-buying platform. 
Lemma 3. When the group-buying platform provides 
complex information environment, vendors offer 














, 𝑎𝑎�1 < 𝑎𝑎1 < min {𝑎𝑎�1 −
1
(1−𝜆𝜆)[𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆−(1−𝑚𝑚)𝛽𝛽]
< Δ𝑎𝑎1 < 0, ?̄?𝑎1}.  
The above result states that when multiple sources of 
information are provided, and when the platform is 
able to engageconsumers to put a relatively high 
weight on the observed number of vouchers sold, 
vendors are willing to participate as long as their 




platform is therefore able to exclude very low-
quality vendors from joining the platform. We next 
analyze whether the participating vendors can 
attract all convertible consumers. 
To see this, we check if this condition holds: 𝑎𝑎0 +
𝑎𝑎1 − 𝑝𝑝 < 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎�1 − 𝑝𝑝1𝑐𝑐.  
We denote 𝐴𝐴2  as such that when 𝑎𝑎1 = 𝐴𝐴2  the 




− 𝑎𝑎1.  Also 
denote ?̄?𝑚  as the solution to (1−𝑚𝑚)𝛽𝛽
𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼
+ 1 + (1 −
𝜆𝜆)Δ𝑎𝑎1((1 −𝑚𝑚)𝛽𝛽 −𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆) = 0 . We state the 
conditions for converting all convertible customers in 
below.  
Proposition 2. When the group-buying platform 
provides a complex information environment, 
vendors can attract all convertible customers under 
any of the following three cases:  
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(1) the vendor’s experience quality is above average, 
i.e., max {𝑎𝑎�1,𝐴𝐴2} < 𝑎𝑎1 < ?̄?𝑎1, or  
(2) customers put significant weight on quantity 
information and the vendor’s experience quality is 
low, i.e., 1+𝜆𝜆+(1−𝜆𝜆)𝛥𝛥𝑎𝑎1𝛽𝛽
(1−𝜆𝜆)𝛥𝛥𝑎𝑎1(𝛽𝛽+𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆)
< 𝑚𝑚 < 1  and 𝑎𝑎1 < 𝑎𝑎1 <
min { 𝑎𝑎�1,𝐴𝐴2}, or  
(3) when customers put significant weight on the 
discount information and the vendor’s experience 
quality is not much lower than the average, i.e., 0 <
𝑚𝑚 < ?̄?𝑚 and 𝐴𝐴2 < 𝑎𝑎1 < 𝑎𝑎�1.   
It is easy to show that ?̄?𝑚 < 1+𝜆𝜆+(1 − 𝜆𝜆)∆𝑎𝑎1𝛽𝛽
(1 − 𝜆𝜆)∆𝑎𝑎1(𝛽𝛽+𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆)
. This 
result describes three different sets of conditions, 
under which the vendor can attract all convertible 
customers through a group-buying promotion. One 
direct observation is that under the complex 
information condition, vendors with any level of 
experience quality can effectively promote through a 
group-buying platform, as long as the platform can 
guide customers to update their beliefs properly. In 
other words, under complex information 
environments, the platform can cater to vendors with 
different experience qualities, through adjusting the 
parameter 𝑚𝑚 . Recall that 𝑚𝑚  measures the relative 
importance of quantity information for consumers’ 
decisions. One potential way of influencing 𝑚𝑚 is by 
varying the accuracy or timeliness of quantity 
information. For example, if the platform updates the 
quantity information every ten minutes, instead of in 
real time, the customers may rely less on the quantity 
information and hence adopt a lower 𝑚𝑚. 
We next compare 𝑝𝑝1𝑐𝑐 to 𝑝𝑝1𝑚𝑚 and summarize the results 
below. We define 𝑁𝑁(𝑎𝑎1)  as 𝑁𝑁(𝑎𝑎1) =
𝛽𝛽(𝑎𝑎0+𝑎𝑎1)
(1−𝜆𝜆)(𝛽𝛽+𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆−𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆𝛽𝛽(𝑎𝑎0+𝑎𝑎1))
, and 𝐴𝐴3 as 𝐴𝐴3 = 𝑎𝑎�1 + 𝑁𝑁(𝐴𝐴3). 
Corollary 2. When the group-buying platform 
provides complex information environment, 
(1) vendors of below-average experience quality, i.e., 
𝑎𝑎1 < 𝑎𝑎1 < 𝑎𝑎�1, always offer larger discounts compared 
to the moderate information environment scenarios;  
(2) vendors of above-average quality offer larger 
discounts compared to the moderate information case 
if 𝐴𝐴3 < 𝑎𝑎1 < ?̄?𝑎1  and ?̄?𝑎1 > 𝑎𝑎�1 + 𝑁𝑁(?̄?𝑎1) ; otherwise, 
they offer lower discounts.   
When the platform provides a complex information 
environment, vendors with low experience quality 
must offer larger discounts compared to the moderate 
information case in order to effectively promote 
themselves. Platforms may have incentives to provide 
more information in order to reduce the uncertainties 
faced by consumers and facilitate transactions. 
However, we discovered that in the setting of group-
buying promotions, some vendors were worse off 
when more information was provided to customers. In 
the complex information environment, low-quality 
vendors face the challenge of further increasing the 
number of vouchers sold in order to entice 
uninformed consumers to purchase, which requires 
them to further lower their prices. Some high-quality 
vendors benefit from the complex information 
environment, particularly those of very high 
experience quality. The reason for this is that a large 
discount, while increasing the quantity sold, can also 
lead to a negative perception by consumers about 
product quality, and vice versa for a small discount. 
The trade-off between these two forces determines 
vendors’ optimal discounting strategy. 
5 Implications of More Information 
Is more information beneficial to vendors? We 
discovered that there exists a trade-off between the 
two types of information, which leads to different 
discounting strategies by vendors with different levels 
of experience quality. Both quantity and discount 
carry useful information about the vendors’ 
experience quality, and they reduce the uncertainty 
and risk faced by uninformed consumers. Vendors 
with high quality therefore do not need to engage in 
deep discounting, as informed customers who are 
aware of their product and quality will “advertise” for 
them through the quantity sold. In the meantime, 
reducing their discount level also prevents 
uninformed consumers from thinking negatively 
about their high experience quality. On the other 
hand, vendors with low experience quality offer 
higher discounts than in the simple promotion case, 
because they need to encourage more informed 
customers to purchase by using high discounts, and in 
turn attract uninformed customers. 
Combining findings from Corollary 2 and Corollary 
1, we draw comparisons about vendors’ discounting 
strategies under the three levels of information. 
Proposition 3. Comparing the vendor’s discounting 
strategy under all three cases, 
(1) when a vendor’s experience quality is below 
average, i.e., 𝑎𝑎1 < 𝑎𝑎1 < 𝑎𝑎�1 , the vendor offers lower 
discounts under the moderate information environment 
than under the complex information environment, that 
is 𝑝𝑝1𝑚𝑚 > 𝑝𝑝1𝑐𝑐, and the vendor has no incentive to offer 
discounts in the simple information environment;  
(2) when a vendor’s experience quality is much 
higher than the average, i.e., 𝐴𝐴3 < 𝑎𝑎1 < ?̄?𝑎1, and ?̄?𝑎1 <
𝑎𝑎�1 + 𝑁𝑁(?̄?𝑎1) , the vendor offers the lowest discount 
under the moderate information environment, and 
offers the highest discount under the simple 
information environment, i.e., 𝑝𝑝1𝑠𝑠 < 𝑝𝑝1𝑐𝑐 < 𝑝𝑝1𝑚𝑚;  
(3) in all other cases, the vendors offer the lowest 
discount under the complex information environment, 




and offer the highest discount under the simple 
information environment, i.e., 𝑝𝑝1𝑠𝑠 < 𝑝𝑝1𝑚𝑚 < 𝑝𝑝1𝑐𝑐;  
One main finding from the above analysis is that 
additional information leads to different effects for 
different types of vendors. On the one hand, high- 
quality vendors always prefer either moderate or 
complex information to simple information; on the 
other hand, some of them would choose moderate 
information over complex information. In other 
words, more information can harm high-quality 
vendors. In contrast, for low-quality vendors, the 
finding is more unanimous in that all low-quality 
vendors prefer moderate information to complex 
information. Our explanation for this intriguing 
finding is that in the complex information 
environment, vendors’ discount choices have opposite 
effects on customers’ purchasing decisions. This 
complexity is particularly harmful for low-quality 
vendors, because they must offer very deep discounts 
in order to increase the quantity sold and hence 
influence convertible customers’ decisions. However, 
complex information can also harm vendors with very 
high quality, i.e., 𝐴𝐴3 < 𝑎𝑎1 < ?̄?𝑎1 . As the platform 
switches from a moderate information to a complex 
information environment, these high-quality vendors 
must offer even larger discounts because they have a 
very high proportion of convertible customers. In other 
words, as more information becomes available to 
customers, vendors must adjust their discounting 
strategy in order to influence customers’ updated beliefs, 
and hence their purchasing decisions. Our analysis 
highlights an aspect that is very important and yet 
different from previous studies. Information, while 
alleviating the quality uncertainty concerning 
consumers’ purchasing decisions in the online 
environment, can also harm vendors through the indirect 
effects of their discount strategies on their customers. 
6 Conclusion  
In this paper, we analyzed the information structure 
on group-buying platforms and its impact on 
customers’ and vendors’ strategies. We focus on three 
types of information contexts: simple, moderate, and 
complex information environments. We have several 
main findings. First, only high-quality vendors join 
the platform under the simple information case 
scenario. As more information is provided to 
customers, low-quality vendors also have incentives 
to promote on the platform. Second, in both the 
moderate and complex information environments, 
both high- and low-quality vendors can promote 
effectively and attract all convertible customers, under 
certain conditions. Third, not all vendors prefer 
complex information to moderate information, 
although all of them prefer either complex or 
moderate information to simple information. In other 
words, more information is not necessarily better for 
the vendors or the platform. 
These results highlight the importance of information 
structure to group-buying platforms. By offering 
different types of information to customers, the 
platform may become popular with vendors of 
different qualities. For instance, to cater to low-
quality vendors, the platform should provide a very 
rich information environment to facilitate customers’ 
purchasing decisions. This can be done by placing the 
discount and quantity information at prominent places 
on a deal’s web page. The platform can also educate 
consumers on how to make more informed decisions 
by using not only quantity information, but also 
discount information. In contrast, to attract high-
quality vendors, the platform should be cautious and 
not provide too much information to customers. It is 
worth highlighting that more information is not 
necessarily better for group-buying platforms, 
depending on the type of information. 
This study can be potentially extended in a few 
directions. First, future studies may look at the case 
scenario of vendors promoting through group-buying 
platforms who do not attract all convertible 
customers. In the current study, we chose to focus on 
the scenario in which vendors experience effective 
promotion, meaning that all customers who are 
interested in buying at regular prices are attracted by 
the promotion. While we believe our focus fits the 
objectives of most vendors promoting on group-
buying platforms, examining other case scenarios 
may provide complementary insights. Second, the 
current model assumes a uniform distribution of 
consumers, and this distribution can be extended to 
other more complex formats to potentially capture 
other consumer characteristics. It would also be 
interesting to examine other types of information on 
group-buying platforms, such as social information. 
Groupon.com now displays social information such as 
Facebook “likes” and Yelp review excerpts on deal 
pages. Although this information is selected by the 
vendors themselves, social information like this may 
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Proof to Proposition 2 
The condition is equivalent to 𝑎𝑎1 − 𝑝𝑝 < 𝑎𝑎�1 − Δ𝑎𝑎1𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆(𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1 − 𝑝𝑝1𝑚𝑚) − 𝑝𝑝1𝑚𝑚 , and can be reorganized as 𝑝𝑝1𝑚𝑚(1 −






). Note that, to ensure 𝑝𝑝1𝑚𝑚 < 𝑝𝑝, we already know that 
𝛥𝛥𝑎𝑎1
2(1−𝛥𝛥𝑎𝑎1𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆(1−𝜆𝜆))
< 0. Therefore, if we multiple both 
sides of the condition with 2(1−𝛥𝛥𝑎𝑎1𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆(1−𝜆𝜆))
𝛥𝛥𝑎𝑎1
, the condition becomes (1 − 𝜆𝜆)(1 − Δ𝑎𝑎1𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆) > 2(1 − Δ𝑎𝑎1𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆(1 −
𝜆𝜆))(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆) 𝑎𝑎0+𝑎𝑎1
2





















− 𝑎𝑎1. It is easy to see that the right side of the equation in decreasing in 𝑎𝑎1. Therefore, when 𝑎𝑎1 > 𝐴𝐴1, 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, and vice versa. Therefore, the condition for 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1 − 𝑝𝑝 < 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎�1 − 𝑝𝑝1𝑚𝑚 can be summarized as 𝑎𝑎1 >




Proof to Corollary 1 







< 0, this can be 
reorganized as comparing 1 with 1 − Δ𝑎𝑎1𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆(1 − 𝜆𝜆) . It is easy to see that 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 < 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  when Δ𝑎𝑎1 < 0, meaning 
vendors with the same quality offer lower discount when quantity is observable to consumers.  
Proof to Lemma 3 
Vendors offer a discount if 𝑝𝑝1𝑐𝑐 < 𝑝𝑝 , meaning 
(1−𝜆𝜆)𝛥𝛥𝑎𝑎1[1−(1−𝑚𝑚)𝛽𝛽(𝑎𝑎0+𝑎𝑎1)]
2[1+𝛥𝛥𝑎𝑎1(1−𝜆𝜆)((1−𝑚𝑚)𝛽𝛽−𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆)]
< 0 . It is easy to see that 1 − (1 −













, the condition cannot hold. When Δ𝑎𝑎1 < 0, 










, the condition can be simplified as 1
(1−𝜆𝜆)[𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆−(1−𝑚𝑚)𝛽𝛽]
< Δ𝑎𝑎1 < 0.  
  





Proof to Proposition 2 
The condition 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1 − 𝑝𝑝 < 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎�1 − 𝑝𝑝1𝑐𝑐  is equivalent to [1 + Δ𝑎𝑎1((1 −𝑚𝑚)𝛽𝛽 − 𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆)]𝑝𝑝1𝑐𝑐 < 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎�1 −
Δ𝑎𝑎1𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼(𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1) −
𝑎𝑎0+𝑎𝑎1
2




(1 − 𝜆𝜆)Δ𝑎𝑎1((1 −𝑚𝑚)𝛽𝛽 −𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆)] > 𝜆𝜆 + 1 + (1 − 𝜆𝜆)Δ𝑎𝑎1((1 −𝑚𝑚)𝛽𝛽 − 𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆) . We already know that, Δ𝑎𝑎1  and 1 +
(1 − 𝜆𝜆)Δ𝑎𝑎1((1 −𝑚𝑚)𝛽𝛽 −𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆) must hold different signs in order for vendors to participate in discount promotion. 
Therefore, when Δ𝑎𝑎1 < 0, the condition becomes 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1 >
𝜆𝜆+1+(1−𝜆𝜆)𝛥𝛥𝑎𝑎1((1−𝑚𝑚)𝛽𝛽−𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆)
𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼[(1−𝑚𝑚)𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 +1+(1−𝜆𝜆)𝛥𝛥𝑎𝑎1((1−𝑚𝑚)𝛽𝛽−𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆)]
. When Δ𝑎𝑎1 > 0, 
we know that 1 + (1 − 𝜆𝜆)Δ𝑎𝑎1((1 −𝑚𝑚)𝛽𝛽 − 𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆) < 0 . If 𝜆𝜆 + 1 + (1 − 𝜆𝜆)Δ𝑎𝑎1((1 −𝑚𝑚)𝛽𝛽 − 𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆) < 0 , or 
equivalently, 𝑚𝑚 > 1+𝜆𝜆+(1−𝜆𝜆)𝛥𝛥𝑎𝑎1𝛽𝛽
(1−𝜆𝜆)𝛥𝛥𝑎𝑎1(𝛽𝛽+𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆)










Denote ?̄?𝑚 as the solution to (1−𝑚𝑚)𝛽𝛽
𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼
+ 1 + (1 − 𝜆𝜆)Δ𝑎𝑎1((1 −𝑚𝑚)𝛽𝛽 − 𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆) = 0. It is easy to see that the left side in 
decreasing in 𝑚𝑚. As a result, (1−𝑚𝑚)𝛽𝛽
𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼
+ 1 + (1 − 𝜆𝜆)Δ𝑎𝑎1((1 −𝑚𝑚)𝛽𝛽 − 𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆) > 0 holds when 𝑚𝑚 < ?̄?𝑚. In any other 
cases, the condition cannot hold.  








− 𝑎𝑎1 , and it is easy to verify that it 
decreases in 𝑎𝑎1. We can therefore restate the conditions above as follows. To ensure 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1 − 𝑝𝑝 < 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎�1 − 𝑝𝑝1𝑐𝑐, 
we need (1) 𝑎𝑎1 > max {𝑎𝑎�1,𝐴𝐴2}, or (2) when 
1+𝜆𝜆+(1−𝜆𝜆)𝛥𝛥𝑎𝑎1𝛽𝛽
(1−𝜆𝜆)𝛥𝛥𝑎𝑎1(𝛽𝛽+𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆)
< 𝑚𝑚 < 1, and 𝑎𝑎1 < min {𝑎𝑎�1,𝐴𝐴2}, or (3) when 0 < 𝑚𝑚 <
?̄?𝑚, 𝐴𝐴2 < 𝑎𝑎1 < 𝑎𝑎�1.  
Proof to Corollary 2 





, which can be simplified as 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎1[1 −
Δ𝑎𝑎1(1 − 𝜆𝜆)(𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆 − (1 −𝑚𝑚)𝛽𝛽)] − Δ𝑎𝑎1[1 − (1 −𝑚𝑚)𝛽𝛽(𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1)][1 − Δ𝑎𝑎1𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆(1 − 𝜆𝜆)] , or equivalently Δ𝑎𝑎1(1 −
𝑚𝑚)[𝛽𝛽(𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1) + Δ𝑎𝑎1(1 − 𝜆𝜆)(𝛽𝛽 + 𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆 − 𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆𝛽𝛽(𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1))]. We denote this expression as 𝑀𝑀 . When Δ𝑎𝑎1 > 0, it is 
easy to see that 𝑀𝑀 > 0 , and consequently 𝑝𝑝1𝑚𝑚 > 𝑝𝑝1𝑐𝑐 . When Δ𝑎𝑎1 < 0 , or 𝑎𝑎1 > 𝑎𝑎�1 , we have 𝑀𝑀 < 0  if 𝑎𝑎1 < 𝑎𝑎�1 +
𝛽𝛽(𝑎𝑎0+𝑎𝑎1)
(1−𝜆𝜆)(𝛽𝛽+𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆−α𝜆𝜆𝛽𝛽(𝑎𝑎0+𝑎𝑎1))
, and vice versa. Denote 𝑁𝑁(𝑎𝑎1) =
𝛽𝛽(𝑎𝑎0+𝑎𝑎1)
(1−𝜆𝜆)(𝛽𝛽+𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆−𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆𝛽𝛽(𝑎𝑎0+𝑎𝑎1))
. It is easy to verify that 𝑁𝑁(𝑎𝑎1) is 
strictly positive and increases in 𝑎𝑎1, and 𝑎𝑎�1 < 𝑎𝑎�1 + 𝑁𝑁(𝑎𝑎1). Therefore, if ?̄?𝑎1 < 𝑎𝑎�1 + 𝑁𝑁(?̄?𝑎1), then 𝑀𝑀 < 0 and 𝑝𝑝1𝑚𝑚 < 𝑝𝑝1𝑐𝑐 
as long as 𝑎𝑎1 > 𝑎𝑎�1. If ?̄?𝑎1 > 𝑎𝑎�1 + 𝑁𝑁(?̄?𝑎1), then there exist 𝐴𝐴3 such that 𝑀𝑀 < 0 and 𝑝𝑝1𝑚𝑚 < 𝑝𝑝1𝑐𝑐 when 𝑎𝑎�1 < 𝑎𝑎1 < 𝐴𝐴3 and 
𝑀𝑀 > 0 and 𝑝𝑝1𝑚𝑚 > 𝑝𝑝1𝑐𝑐 when 𝐴𝐴3 < 𝑎𝑎1 < ?̄?𝑎1, where 𝐴𝐴3 = 𝑎𝑎�1 + 𝑁𝑁(𝐴𝐴3).  
Proof to Proposition 3 
We also need to compare 𝑝𝑝1𝑠𝑠  with 𝑝𝑝1𝑐𝑐  under Δ𝑎𝑎1 < 0, which is equivalent to comparing 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 𝑚𝑚[𝛽𝛽(𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1) +
𝛽𝛽Δ𝑎𝑎1(1 − 𝜆𝜆) + Δ𝑎𝑎1𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆(1 − 𝜆𝜆)]  with 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 𝛽𝛽(𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1) + 𝛽𝛽Δ𝑎𝑎1(1 − 𝜆𝜆) . Note that 𝛽𝛽(𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1) + 𝛽𝛽Δ𝑎𝑎1(1 − 𝜆𝜆) =
𝛽𝛽(𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1 + (1 − 𝜆𝜆)(𝑎𝑎�1 − 𝑎𝑎1))  is positive, and [𝛽𝛽(𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1) + 𝛽𝛽Δ𝑎𝑎1(1 − 𝜆𝜆) + Δ𝑎𝑎1𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆(1 − 𝜆𝜆)] < 𝛽𝛽(𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1) +
𝛽𝛽Δ𝑎𝑎1(1 − 𝜆𝜆). When [𝛽𝛽(𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1) + βΔ𝑎𝑎1(1 − 𝜆𝜆) + Δ𝑎𝑎1𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆(1 − 𝜆𝜆)] > 0, we have 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 < 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 due to 𝑚𝑚 < 1. When 
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